The new intrusion tort: The news media exposed? by McKenzie, Thomas Levy
 THOMAS LEVY MCKENZIE 
 
 
 
 
THE NEW INTRUSION TORT: 
THE NEWS MEDIA EXPOSED? 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for the LLB (Honours) Degree 
 
 
Faculty of Law 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laws489 Thomas McKenzie 300188699 
 
 
 
 
2
Abstract ...................................................................................... 2 
I Introduction ........................................................................... 3 
II Policy Justifications for the Intrusion Tort ............................ 4 
III How Should the Courts Develop Whata J’s Formulation? ... 6 
A The Formulation .................................................................................. 7 
B Intentional and Unauthorised Intrusion ............................................ 10 
C Into Seclusion .................................................................................... 11 
D Reasonable Expectation of Privacy .................................................... 16 
E Highly Offensive ................................................................................ 19 
F Legitimate Public Concern ................................................................. 22 
IV  How Should the Intrusion Tort Interact with the Publicity 
Tort? ........................................................................................ 26 
V Conclusion .......................................................................... 29 
VI Appendices ......................................................................... 30 
VII Bibliography ..................................................................... 33 
Abstract 
In C v Holland, Whata J recognised that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion 
formed part of New Zealand’s common law. The tort protects against 
intentional intrusions into a person’s private space. This decision potentially 
exposes the news media to tortious liability when it engages in intrusive 
newsgathering practices. However, Whata J’s decision provides little 
guidance as to how the tort should be applied in later cases. In order to 
ascertain the meaning of the tort’s formulation, this essay draws upon the 
methods used, both in New Zealand and internationally, to prevent the news 
media from breaching individual privacy rights. It then suggests that the 
courts should replace the formulation with a one-step reasonable expectation 
of privacy test. It also argues that the legitimate public concern defence 
should be better tailored to the intrusion context. Finally, it briefly assesses 
how the intrusion tort should interact with the tort in Hosking v Runting. 
Ultimately, it concludes that, in future, the courts should reflect more 
carefully on the precise wording of the intrusion tort’s formulation so that it 
best vindicates the interests that it was designed to protect.  
C v Holland – invasion of privacy tort –intrusion upon seclusion – 
newsgathering – news media liability 
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I Introduction 
C lived in a house with her boyfriend, Z, and Mr Holland. One day, while 
borrowing Mr Holland’s laptop to watch movies, Z found a video file on the 
laptop with C’s nickname as the title. He tried to access the file, but the link 
was missing. Z waited until Mr Holland had left the house to search Mr 
Holland’s hard-drive for the file of the same name. Z discovered that Mr 
Holland had installed a video camera in the roof cavity in their bathroom. 
Mr Holland had been surreptitiously filming C while she showered. The 
police charged Mr Holland for making an intimate visual recording.1 Mr 
Holland pleaded guilty, was convicted, had to pay $1000 in reparation, and 
was discharged without penalty.2 
 C, still distressed about the filming, brought proceedings against Mr 
Holland in tort for invasion of privacy. Previous case law had only 
permitted a person to succeed in such a claim where there was publication 
of private facts. Mr Holland had not shown the movie file to anybody else.3 
The High Court was faced with a unique issue: can a person have an 
actionable claim in tort for breach of privacy where there is no publication 
of private facts? In essence, Whata J was required to decide whether the tort 
of intrusion upon seclusion forms part of the law of New Zealand. He held 
that it did.4  
 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion provides a cause of action 
against those who intrude upon a person’s private space without publishing 
any information gathered from the intrusion. Thus, Whata J’s decision 
affects a number of entities, including the news media. Prior to his decision, 
the news media could only be liable in tort where it published private facts 
about the plaintiff. Liability risk only became an issue at the point of 
publication. Following C v Holland (Holland), the news media can be held 
liable at the point of newsgathering where intrusive methods are used. This 
might have a chilling effect on newsgathering activities. 
 This essay will evaluate how the tort of intrusion upon seclusion 
should develop in order to strike a balance between the protection of 
individual privacy rights and the news media’s ability to freely engage in 
newsgathering activities. First, it will discuss the policy justifications for the 
tort. Secondly, it will analyse Whata J’s formulation of the tort and suggest 
                                                     
 
1 Under the Crimes Act 1961, s 216H. 
2 The above facts are detailed in C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155 at [2]. 
3 C v Holland, above n 2, at [2]. 
4 C v Holland, above n 2, at [93]. 
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how the courts should develop it. Thirdly, it will recommend how the 
intrusion tort should interact with the existing tort of publicity given to 
private facts. For the purposes of this essay, the news media is defined as an 
entity whose publishing activities involve a significant element of 
aggregation of news, information and opinion of current value, which is 
then disseminated to a public audience on a regular basis.5  
II Policy Justifications for the Intrusion Tort 
The intrusion tort protects against interferences with an individual’s private 
space, as opposed to the publicity tort, which concerns dissemination of 
private information about a person. Often, the news media will have to 
interfere with such space in order to gather news. Newsgathering is 
intimately connected to the publication of stories that are of legitimate 
interest to the public in a free and democratic society. Tortious liability for 
such intrusions therefore has the ability to hinder investigative journalism 
that exposes serious wrongdoing. Any limitation on newsgathering must be 
justified. This section sets out how the intrusion tort upholds the traditional 
values that justify legal protection of individual privacy.  
The tort protects individual dignity. When someone breaches another 
person’s privacy it affects that latter person’s dignity in two ways. First, the 
former is disregarding the latter’s ability to choose which aspects of his or 
her life are to be kept private, suggesting his or her choices do not merit 
respect, and consequently undermining his or her sense of self-worth.6 
Secondly, the former is ignoring the probable effect that his intrusion will 
have on the latter’s emotional wellbeing.
7
 So, when a tabloid publishes 
private information about an individual, the tabloid is placing its desire to 
publish above the individual’s want for privacy, knowing full well that the 
individual may suffer emotional distress as a result.8  Or, in the context of a 
                                                     
 
5 This definition is adapted from the definition of the news media provided by the Law 
Commission in Law Commission The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, 
Responsibilities and Regulation in a Digital Age (NZLC r 128, 2013) at [44]. 
6 Nicole Moreham “Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the 
New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort” in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) Law, 
Liberty, Legislation (LexisNexis, 2008) 231 at 236. 
7 Nicole Moreham “Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the 
New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort”, above n 6, at 237. 
8 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort” (2012) 37 
Queen’s LJ 167 at 204. 
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physical intrusion, when peeping-toms watch these individuals getting 
undressed, they are is placing their choice to peep above these individuals’ 
desires to get changed in private, while ignoring that the individuals might 
feel violated as a consequence.9 To provide a remedy in tort for the tabloid’s 
actions while not providing one for the peeping-tom’s actions would fail to 
uphold this dignity value.  
Privacy advances individual autonomy. Autonomy is the power to 
make and exercise independent moral judgment, even when such judgment 
is not a popular one.
10
 Individuals choose how they wish to present 
themselves to society so as not to solicit the judgment of others.11 When 
individuals retreat from society to their own private space, they are safe to 
develop their own thoughts and engage in certain behaviours without fear 
that they will be persecuted for behaving in that way.12 Thus, when peeping-
toms observe individuals without their knowledge, the peeping-toms are 
taking away individuals’ freedom to decide how they present themselves to 
society.13 Thus, when individuals suspect or find out that somebody is 
watching them, it stifles their ability to exercise autonomy because they do 
not feel safe behaving in a way that might attract public scorn.14 
The advancement of autonomy is necessary in order to safeguard 
freedom of expression. People do not like being publically judged for their 
failures. An individual needs to be insulated from ridicule and censure in 
early stages of experimentation. Thus, if individuals feel that they are under 
constant surveillance while testing a radical or new idea, they might be too 
afraid of persecution to engage in learning, creation or questioning.15 
                                                     
 
9 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, above n 8, at 
204. 
10 Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89(3) Yale Law Journal 421 at 
449. 
11 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, above n 8, at 
206. 
12 Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980), above n 10, at 448. 
13 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, above n 8, at 
206. 
14 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, above n 8, at 
207. 
15 Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980), above n 10, at 448. 
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Similarly, individuals are less likely to engage freely in communications 
with others where they think such conversations are being intercepted in an 
intrusive manner. For example where those individuals’ phones are being 
tapped, or where their conversations are recorded through directional 
microphones.16 
Also linked to the autonomy value is the preservation of mental 
wellbeing. When individuals fail to conduct themselves in accordance with 
society’s behavioural norms, they might be shunned within their 
communities.
17
 The ability to retreat to a private sphere removes pressure to 
constantly conform with societal norms, encourages emotional release and 
ultimately allows the individual to relax.18 If this sphere is not protected, 
and individuals are subject to intrusive surveillance, they might become 
repressed, alienated, inhibited and suffer from a mental breakdown as a 
result of not being able to discard the image of themselves that they project 
publically.19  
 
III How Should the Courts Develop Whata J’s Formulation? 
The previous section detailed the policy justifications for guarding against 
intrusions upon a person’s seclusion. This essay will now discuss how the 
should courts develop Whata J’s formulation of the intrusion tort in 
Holland.  
                                                     
 
16 Nicole Moreham “Privacy Rights” in Mark Warby QC, Nicole Moreham and Iain 
Christie (eds) Tugendhat & Christie’s The Law of Privacy and the Media (Second Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 59 at [2.61]. See also the discussion in the United 
States Supreme Court case of Bartnicki v Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) at 24 where Rehnquist 
J, in his dissenting judgment, argued that allowing media defendants to escape liability for 
illegally intercepting phone conversations would have a chilling effect on the free speech of 
millions of people who rely on electronic technology to communicate. 
17 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, above n 8, at 
210. 
18 Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualising Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, above n 8, at 
211. 
19 Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980), above n 10, at 448. 
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A The Formulation 
A successful claim under Whata J’s formulation requires:
20
 
(a) an intentional and unauthorised intrusion; 
(b) into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or 
affairs); 
(c) involving an infringement of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; 
(d) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
Whata J suggests that a legitimate public concern in the information 
might provide a defence to a claim in intrusion.21 Presumably “information” 
refers to the information gathered as a result of the intrusive act.  
This formulation was not developed in a vacuum. Whata J drew 
upon a number of New Zealand and international sources to inform his test. 
His starting point was the leading New Zealand Court of Appeal decision on 
breach of privacy, Hosking v Runting (Hosking).22 In this decision, a 
majority of the Court held that the wrongful publication of private facts was 
an actionable common law tort if the plaintiff could show:
23
 
(1) The existence of facts in respect of which there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy; and 
(2) Publicity given to those private facts that would be 
considered highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person. 
A legitimate public concern in the information is a defence to any claim.
24
 
Whata J considered that the intrusion tort should develop in line with the 
existing Hosking tort.25 The “reasonable expectation of privacy”, “highly 
offensive” and “legitimate public concern” elements of Whata J’s 
formulation are taken directly from the Hosking test.  
                                                     
 
20 C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
21 C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
22 In Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) the plaintiffs were a celebrity couple who 
sued a magazine in order to prevent the publication of photos taken of their twin daughters 
on a busy public street. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful because the photographs published 
were not “private facts” in which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
23 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [117]. 
24 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [134]. 
25 C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
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 Whata J also believed that his formulation should maintain as much 
consistency as possible with the relevant North American authorities.26 In 
the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) divides 
the right to privacy into four separate torts,27 one of which protects against 
intrusions:28 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
Jones v Tsige (Jones), a recent decision of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, incorporated the United States’ intrusion tort into the Canadian 
common law.
29
 Jones summarises the elements of the United States tort 
as:30  
(1) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion;  
(2) that intrusion was highly offensive to the reasonable 
person;  
(3)  the matter intruded on was private; and 
(4) the intrusion caused anguish and suffering.  
Whata J’s formulation adopts all these elements, except for “anguish and 
suffering” because he considered that element to be more relevant to the 
assessment of damages.
31
  
 In addition to the New Zealand and North American common law, 
Whata J found support for his new tort in New Zealand legislation that 
protects against unreasonable intrusions. He did this to show that Parliament 
accepts that individuals have the right to be free from intrusions into their 
private space in certain situations.
32
 Although Whata J did not use these 
pieces of legislation to develop his formulation, the courts could look to the 
jurisprudence behind these pieces of legislation to develop the tort in future 
decisions.   
                                                     
 
26 C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
27 This is discussed at C v Holland, above n 2, at [13]-[14]; See also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts (1977), §652A. The text of the Restatement can be found at appendix 4.  
28 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §652B. 
29 Jones v Tsige [2012] ONCA 32. 
30 See discussion in C v Holland, above n 2, at [15], referring to Jones v Tsige, above n 29, 
at [56].  
31 C v Holland, above n 2, at [18]. 
32 C v Holland, above n 2, at [22]. 
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One example of legislative protection against intrusion is found in 
the Broadcasting Act 1989. This Act gives jurisdiction to the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority (BSA) to deal with complaints against the broadcast 
media where the media breaches an individual’s privacy. The BSA can 
award damages where a breach has occurred.33 These complaints are judged 
against the BSA’s Privacy Principles. A breach of Privacy Principle 3
34
 will 
occur where the broadcast media publically discloses material obtained 
through an intentional interference with an individual’s interest in seclusion 
in a way that is highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.
35
 A 
person will generally not have an interest in seclusion when they are in a 
public place,36 but this public place exemption does not apply when the 
individual is particularly vulnerable and the disclosure is highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person.37 BSA Privacy Principle 838 also provides a 
public interest defence to defendants akin to that in the Hosking tort where 
the matter disclosed is of legitimate public concern.39 
 Another example of legislative protection is found in the Privacy Act 
1993. Whata J referred to Principle 4(b)(i) of the Act, which prevents an 
“agency” from colleting information through means that intrude upon an 
individual’s personal affairs to an unreasonable extent.40 If information is 
collected in a way that breaches this principle, a complaint can be brought 
before the Privacy Commissioner.41 Although exemptions to the Privacy 
Act limit its utility,
42
 the Act is useful to help ascertain the policy 
                                                     
 
33 However, the maximum compensation that can be awarded for a successful complaint is 
$5,000. For further information see John Burrows & Ursula Cheer (eds) Media Law in New 
Zealand (6th edition, Wellinton, Lexis Nexis, 2010) at 350. 
34 For the text of Privacy Principle 3, see appendix 1. 
35 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(1). 
36 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(2). 
37 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(3). 
38 For the text of Privacy Principle 8, see appendix 1. 
39 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 8. 
40  Privacy Act 1993, s 6. 
41 Privacy Commissioner “Privacy Act & Codes: Manner of Collection of Personal 
Information (Principle 4)” <www.privacy.org.nz>. 
42 The News Media are largely exempt from the Privacy Act 1993 because the definition of 
“agency” in s 2 excludes any news medium in relation to “news activities”. “News 
activities” include the preparation and public dissemination of programmes concerning 
news or observations on news, including current affairs and consumer affairs shows and 
publications. 
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considerations that Parliament wishes to advance with respect to the 
protection of privacy.43 
 One further piece of legislation, to which Whata J referred, is Part 
9A of the Crimes Act 1961. This protects against unauthorised intrusions 
into personal space. In particular, it is a crime to make an intimate visual 
recording of another person.
44
  
 With these sources in mind, this essay will now turn to consider how 
the courts should develop the individual elements of Whata J’s formulation.  
 
B Intentional and Unauthorised Intrusion 
The first question is how should later courts develop the first element of the 
tort, “intentional and unauthorised intrusion”? This requirement is taken 
from the summary of the United States’ tort in Jones. In Holland Whata J 
held that Mr Holland intentionally intruded when he videoed C in the 
shower “without her consent and otherwise without legislative authority.”
45
 
In order to develop this element of the tort, the courts will have to clarify 
what each of its key terms “intentional, “intrusion” and “unauthorised” 
means.  
  “Intentional” means an affirmative act, not an accidental or careless 
act.
46
 Like other intentional torts such as battery, assault and false 
imprisonment, intention should not require knowledge that the intrusion was 
wrong; it should merely require intention to commit the act.47 Thus, a 
plaintiff should not be denied a remedy where the defendant mistakenly 
believes that he or she had lawful authority or the plaintiff’s consent to 
intrude. 
It then follows that the term “intrusion” requires the plaintiff to 
identify a positive act committed by the defendant. Whata J did not explain 
what kinds of acts are “intrusions”. Tugendhat
48
 provides a useful starting 
point. It identifies recording private conversations, covertly filming people 
                                                     
 
43 Hosking v Runting [2003] 3 NZLR 385 at [97]. 
44 Crimes Act 1961, s 126H. 
45 C v Holland, above n 2, at [99].  
46 C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
47 Such a view is also shared, but for different reasons, by Stephen Penk & Rosemary Tobin 
“The New Zealand Tort of Invasion of Privacy: Future Directions” (2011) 19 Torts Law 
Journal 191 at 208.  
48 Mark Warby QC, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie (eds) Tugendhat & Christie’s The 
Law of Privacy and the Media (Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). 
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without their permission, taking photographs with long-lensed cameras, 
stalking people, pursuing people for interviews and obtaining confidential 
documents as potentially intrusive acts in the news media context.49 
 “Unauthorised” means that there is no consent to the intrusion or that 
the intrusion is not authorised by law.50 Whata J did not have to fully 
consider the meaning of unauthorised in the case because it was clear that C 
did not consent to the filming, nor was Mr Holland legally authorised to do 
so.  
Consent is a defence to an intrusive act in the United States tort,
 51
 to 
a charge under s 216G of the Crimes Act, and can mitigate a complaint 
under principle 4(b)(i) of the Privacy Act. The Crimes and Privacy Acts 
require informed consent. For the purposes of principle 4(b)(i), if the 
consent was induced by impersonation it will still amount to an 
unreasonable intrusion.
52
 Similarly, consent to a charge of making intimate 
visual recording requires that the person in the recording be of sufficient age 
and competence to appreciate the nature of the defendant’s conduct.53 It 
would be consistent with this jurisprudence to remove the term 
“unauthorised” from this first element and replace it with the defences of 
“informed consent” and “lawful authority”. This would shift the onus of 
proof to the defendant, which is desirable because defendants will often be 
in a better position to point to evidence of consent or the lawful authority if 
this is what induced them to commit the intrusive act in the first place. 
C Into Seclusion 
The next element of the formulation is “into seclusion (namely intimate 
personal activity, space or affairs)”.54 This element is taken from the 
Restatement, which reads: “…upon the solitude or seclusion of another or 
his private affairs or concerns…”55 Whata J explained that “not every 
intrusion into a private matter is actionable”
56
 and that the “reference to 
intimate personal activity acknowledges the need to establish intrusion into 
                                                     
 
49 Nicole Moreham “Privacy Rights”, above n 16, at [2.16]. 
50 C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
51 William L Prosser “Privacy” (1960) 48(3) California Law Review 383 at 419. 
52 See Case No 14824 [1997] NZPrivCmr 14.  
53 Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Offences and Defences (online looseleaf 
ed, Brookers). 
54 C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
55 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §652B. 
56 C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
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matters that most directly impinge on personal autonomy”.
57
 He later said: 
“Mr Holland intruded into C’s intimate space and activity when he videoed 
her in the shower.”58 Little guidance was given as to the scope of the term 
“seclusion”. All that can be ascertained from the case is that a person’s 
private bathroom is an area of “seclusion”. 
So, what might Whata J mean by “seclusion”? The Restatement 
provides a useful staring point. It states that the physical intrusion must 
occur in a place where plaintiffs have “secluded” their person or things.59 
For example, plaintiffs are secluded when they are in spaces such as their 
home, or when recovering in a hospital room.60 Plaintiffs are not secluded 
when in public.61 Consistent with this, plaintiffs have been denied recovery 
when the news media filmed a suspect of a crime in the publically 
accessible hallways of the sheriff’s department,62 filmed into the interior of 
a shop from outside the storefront window,
63
 filmed a person walking from 
his house to his car,64 and pursued an interview with a company president in 
the public space outside the company’s building.65 
However, the fact that someone is in public has not always defeated 
a plaintiff’s claim. For example there was an actionable intrusion in a public 
space when a member of the press took a photograph of a young woman 
whose skirt had blown over her head revealing her underwear.66 This case 
shows that the courts will sometimes take a normative approach, rather than 
a locational approach, when deciding whether an intrusion has occurred. 
The normative approach looks to the specific circumstances of the case and 
asks: would fairness and justice dictate that plaintiff ought to succeed?  
Whata J’s formulation appears to require both a locational and a 
normative inquiry. His second element asks: is the plaintiff in a state of 
“seclusion”?67 This is a locational inquiry. His third element asks: does the 
                                                     
 
57 C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
58 C v Holland, above n 2, at [99]. 
59 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §652B comment (b). 
60 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §652B comment (b). 
61 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §652B comment (c). 
62 Haynik v Zimlich 30 Ohio Misc 2d 16 (1986). 
63 Mark v Seattle Times 96 Wash 2d 473 (1981). 
64 Aisenson v American Broadcasting Company 220 Cal App 3d 146 (Cal 1990). 
65 Machleder v Diaz 538 F Supp 1362 (SDNY, 1982). 
66 Daily Times Democrat v Graham 276 Ala 380 (1964). 
67 C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
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intrusion involve “infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy”?
68
 
This is a normative inquiry. In developing his formulation, Whata J seems 
to have been influenced by Shulman v Group W Productions (Shulman), one 
of the leading United States media intrusion cases.69 In this case the 
Californian Supreme Court set out a two-stage test to work out whether 
there has been an intrusion upon the seclusion of another.
70
 First, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant “penetrated some zone of physical or 
sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the 
plaintiff”, i.e. the locational inquiry.
71
 Second, the plaintiff must have had a 
“reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or 
data source”, i.e. the normative inquiry.72 
But is it desirable to require both a locational and normative inquiry? 
The locational analysis might provide an additional hurdle for recovery in 
order to ensure that only deserving plaintiffs who suffer from truly invasive 
intrusions can recover. Yet this strict locational analysis has attracted much 
criticism. Although location will always play a part in the analysis as to 
whether the defendant has breached the plaintiff’s privacy, its use as the sole 
test to determine whether an intrusion has occurred fails to consider other 
relevant factors that might lead plaintiffs to believe that they have an 
expectation of privacy.73 This essay advocates the removal of the strict 
locational requirement. 
The strict locational requirement fails to uphold the interests that the 
tort protects. Shulman illustrates the failure of the locational requirement to 
uphold the dignitary interest of the tort. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed 
that their right to privacy was intruded upon (1) when the cameraman filmed 
the accident scene, (2) when accompanied by reporters in the helicopter that 
                                                     
 
68 C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
69 In Shulman v Group W Productions 955 P 2d 469 (Cal 1998) the plaintiffs were a mother 
and a son who had been in a serious car accident. The defendants produced a documentary 
programme that followed first respondents to emergency scenes. The defendants sent a 
cameraman along to the scene of the plaintiff’s accident to gather footage and audio 
recordings of the paramedics rescuing the plaintiffs from the accident. The plaintiffs sued 
for intrusion of privacy. 
70 Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 69, at 490. 
71 Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 69, at 490. 
72 Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 69, at 490. 
73 See Dr Nicole Moreham “Private Matters: A Review of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority” (NZBSA, 2009) at 12-13; and Chris DL Hunt “Privacy in the Common Law: A 
Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision in Jones v Tsige” (2012) 37 
Queens LJ 665 at 686-688.  
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took them to hospital, and (3) when their conversations were recorded 
through microphones attached to the rescuers. The Court allowed claims (2) 
and (3) because there was an interest in seclusion in the interior of the 
helicopter and only unaided ears could hear the conversations.74 But the 
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that there was an interest in seclusion 
in the accident scene itself.
75
 This was because the accident happened on a 
public road. But it is not the location of the intrusion that determines 
whether the plaintiffs’ dignity has been undermined. Rather, the plaintiffs’ 
dignity was undermined because they were filmed while in a vulnerable 
state.76 The filming turned the plaintiffs’ suffering into a spectacle.77  
Similar criticism can be made in the BSA context. In TVNZ v 
Davies, TVNZ had filmed the complainant while he was collecting scallops. 
The complainant was unsuccessful in his intrusion claim because he was 
publically visible from a little-travelled roadway.
78
 This location-based 
decision fails to uphold the autonomy and mental health interests that the 
intrusion tort protects. The complainant might have been collecting shellfish 
in order to retreat from societal pressures, which would be beneficial for his 
emotional wellbeing. Also, in finding that the plaintiff’s activities were 
“public” on the basis that he was visible to people generally, the BSA failed 
to come to grips with the fact that what is “public” is a matter of degree. The 
complainant was only in “public” in the sense that a small group of people 
could actually see him. Broadcasting the footage on national television 
makes the activity “public” on a much larger scale.79 
An additional argument against the use of a location-based inquiry is 
that it is notoriously difficult to define “seclusion” based purely on location; 
to do so would be an oversimplification that could potentially lead to 
injustice.80 Gleeson CJ in ABC v Lenah Meats (quoted in Hosking) reasoned 
                                                     
 
74 Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 69, at 491. 
75 Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 69, at 490. 
76 See discussion in N.A. Moreham “Privacy in Public Places” (2006) NZLJ 265 at 267-
268. 
77 See a critical discussion of the decision in Shulman in Chris DL Hunt “Privacy in the 
Common Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision in Jones v 
Tsige”, above n 73, at 680. 
78 Davies v TVNZ [2005] NZBSA 17 at [20]. 
79 Dr Nicole Moreham “Private Matters: A Review of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority”, above n 73, at 11. 
80 Chris DL Hunt “Privacy in the Common Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal’s Decision in Jones v Tsige”, above n 73, at 685. 
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that while the term “public” is a convenient tool to draw a line between 
what is private and what is not, the reality is that an activity is not private 
purely because it does not occur in public.81 A locational definition of 
privacy also fails to recognise that most people understand privacy to be a 
subjective concept.82 For example, one person may believe that her income 
is an intensely private matter, another may boast about his income to 
anybody who will listen.83 
The strict locational requirement is also out of step with current New 
Zealand law. The “seclusion” element of Whata J’s test is similar to the 
term “private facts” from the first limb of the Hosking tort. When applying 
the first limb of the Hosking tort, the courts do not engage in two separate 
inquiries, where (hypothetically) the first would look to whether there are 
“facts” that are private (in the sense that they are known to only a limited 
number of people), and second, whether there is a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” in those facts. Rather, the courts determine whether “facts” are 
private by analysing whether there was a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” that renders them private.
84
 Tipping J’s alternative formulation of 
the tort in his concurring judgment did not even use the term “private facts”. 
He believed that information becomes “private” either from the nature of the 
information or the circumstances that the defendant came into the 
information, not based on how many people are aware of the information.85  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has indicated that the exceptional 
circumstances of a case may qualify the general rule that a person has no 
right to privacy in public.86 BSA Principle 3(3) also recognises that the 
public place exemption does not apply where the plaintiff is particularly 
vulnerable.87  
                                                     
 
81 ABC v Lenah Game Meats [2001] HCA 63; (2001) 185 ALR 1 at [42]. 
82 NA Moreham “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis” 
(2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 628 at 641.  
83 This example is taken from NA Moreham “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal 
and Theoretical Analysis”, above n 82.  
84 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [164]. In Hosking Gault P and Blanchard J held that 
the photographs of the Hosking twins in New Idea! Magazine did not publicise facts to 
which there were a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
85 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [249]. 
86 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [164], see also comments made by Anderson J in the 
same judgment at [271]. 
87 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(3). 
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Lastly, in the New Zealand experience, the locational inquiry does 
little analytical work. BSA Principle 3 requires there to be an interference 
with the plaintiff’s interest in “seclusion”. In Canwest, Harrison J defined 
“seclusion” as a zone of “screening off or shutting off from the outside 
access or public view.”88 But when determining whether the plaintiff was in 
a state of seclusion, he asked the normative question: did the plaintiff have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in that zone?89 Subsequent decisions 
have followed Harrison J’s approach.90 This approach is undesirable 
because it creates uncertainty in Principle 3’s application by failing to 
specify how this locational requirement should be dealt with in future cases. 
For the above reasons, this essay suggests the strict locational 
inquiry should be removed from the formulation. Instead, it should be 
replaced by a single “reasonable expectation of privacy” test that will 
conduct a normative inquiry into whether plaintiffs “ought” to expect that 
their activities are private.  
D Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
So, if there is to be no strict locational requirement then how should the 
courts develop the reasonable expectation of privacy element? Whata J 
included this element in order to achieve consistency with the existing 
Hosking tort.
91
 He concluded that when Mr Holland videoed C in the 
shower it infringed her reasonable expectation of privacy.92 Because Whata 
J did not discuss this requirement in detail, it is necessary to consider how 
this requirement works. 
This essay suggests that a broad, contextual approach should 
establish whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
would be similar to the approach taken by the United Kingdom Court of 
Appeal in the breach of confidence context.93 Relevant considerations 
                                                     
 
88 Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY [2008] NZAR 1 (HC) at [42]. 
89 Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 88, at [44]-[45].  
90 See, for example, Television New Zealand Ltd v KW HC Auckland CIV-2007-485-1609, 
18 December 2008 at [65]. 
91 C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
92 C v Holland, above n 2, at [99]. 
93 In Murray v Big Pictures Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 at [36] the English 
Court of Appeal formulated the following test to establish whether a person had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an action of breach of confidence: 
This is an objective test but is a broad one and essentially a question of fact. The 
Court must take account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the 
attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant was 
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include: (i) the location of the intrusion, (ii) the purpose for which the 
plaintiff is in that location, (iii) the nature of the plaintiff’s activity, (iv) the 
method of intrusion, (v) any indication that the plaintiff does not agree to 
the intrusion, and (vi) the impact on the plaintiff. Each of these 
considerations will be explained below.  
Although this essay has argued that an approach based purely on 
location is problematic, the location where the intrusion takes place is an 
important consideration. In the United States, a plaintiff will always have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home,
 94
 or in a place with 
restricted public access, such as his or her workplace.95 The BSA has taken 
a similar approach. A complainant’s right of ownership or possession in the 
location will inform whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.96  
Thus, complainants have a reasonable expectation of privacy when filmed 
by a hidden camera while opening their front doors,
97
 in the waiting areas of 
a business that operated inside a house,98 when taking photographs of 
models in their own homes,99 when carrying out employment duties inside a 
house that belongs to someone else,
100
 and on their properties when they are 
not at home.101  
Whether the plaintiff is in a public place is not determinative. In 
Andrews v TVNZ (Andrews) the plaintiffs, who brought their claim under 
the Hosking tort, were held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when they were filmed being rescued from their cars following an accident 
on a public road.102 But if the plaintiff is in a public location, it should 
certainly militate against finding an expectation of privacy. 
The consideration of the purpose for which the plaintiff is in the 
location where the intrusion takes place contemplates whether the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                                       
 
engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of the 
intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, 
the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for 
which the information came to the publisher. 
94 Dietemann v Time Inc 449 F 2d 245 (9th Cir 1971). 
95 Sanders v ABC 978 F 2d 67 (Cal 1999). 
96 Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 88, at [42]. 
97 Television New Zealand Ltd v KW , above n 90, at [62]-[63]. 
98 Television New Zealand Ltd v KW, above n 90, at [64]-[65]. 
99 Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 88, at [44] & [48]. 
100 CP v TVWorks Ltd [2012] NZBSA 69. 
101 Balfour v TVNZ [2005] NZBSA 129. 
102 Andrews v Televisions New Zealand Ltd [2009] 1 NZLR 220 (HC) at [66]. 
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has retreated somewhere to escape from the public gaze. If so, it will point 
towards a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The nature of the plaintiff’s activity should also be borne in mind. If 
the plaintiff is engaging in an intimate activity, for example toileting or 
engaging in sexual activity, then this should enhance the plaintiff’s 
expectation of privacy. This approach was adopted in the United States 
decision in Daily Times Democrat v Graham (mentioned earlier) where the 
defendant photographed the plaintiff’s underwear.103  
Sometimes the activity is so intimate that the location where the 
intrusion occurs is irrelevant. Support for this can be found in s 216G(1) of 
the Crimes Act 1961. Section 216G(1)(a) makes it a crime to make a visual 
recording of another without his or her knowledge or consent when that 
person in a place where he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
and is either naked, engaging in sexual activity or is showering, toileting or 
undressing.  Section 216G(1)(b) makes it a crime to make a visual recording 
of a person’s intimate body parts from beneath his or her clothing or through 
his or her outer clothing. In the latter provision, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is not a specific requirement. It seems that the circumstances 
covered by s 216G(1)(b) are so intimate that it is assumed that a person will 
have an expectation of privacy.  
The same should go where the plaintiff is in a particularly vulnerable 
situation. BSA Privacy Principle 3 states that, in general, a person does not 
have an interest in seclusion when in public,104 but recognises that this 
public place exemption does not apply where the complainant is 
vulnerable.
105
 In CD v TV3 Network Services (CD) the complainant was 
filmed being extracted from her car following an accident, which was 
broadcast on a comedy show called “Ice As”. The broadcast breached 
Principle 3 because the complainant was traumatised and bleeding from a 
head wound.106 
The method of intrusion should be relevant. Where the defendant 
needs to use a hidden camera, covert recording device, telescopic lens, or 
other surreptitious means to intrude upon the plaintiff’s activity, this will 
indicate that the plaintiff did not intend for his or her activity to be public, 
and will consequently point towards a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
                                                     
 
103 Daily Times Democrat v Graham, above n 66. 
104 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(2). 
105 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(3).  
106 CD v TV3 Network Services Ltd [2000] NZBSA 141, 142, 143. 
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The BSA has held that surreptitious filming with a hidden camera will 
almost always be an intrusion.107  
However, where the plaintiffs are aware of cameras, recording 
devices or the defendant’s mere presence and go about their business 
regardless, this will point against the finding of an expectation of privacy. In 
the BSA decision in BQ and CR v TVNZ Ltd a couple, who were shown 
bidding on a house during a reality TV show, were unsuccessful in their 
intrusion claim because they were aware of the presence of cameras.108 
Where plaintiffs have made it clear that they want to be left alone, 
this may enhance the expectation. Another reason why the complainant in 
CD was successful was because the cameraman continued to film the 
complainant long after she had requested him to stop.109 
Lastly, where the defendant acts in a way that is distressing to the 
plaintiff, then this should aid the finding of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. In Hosking, Anderson J believed that if there was an element of 
embarrassment or distress involved in taking the photographs of the children 
on the public street then that might have been enough to decide the case 
differently.110 He discussed Peck v United Kingdom, a decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, where the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CCTV footage that recorded him attempting to 
commit suicide.111 A similar approach was taken in the BSA decision in CD 
where the complainant was ridiculed during the broadcast for her behaviour 
following the car-crash. The BSA found that the broadcast reached a point 
where it became “so offensive and intrusive as to constitute a form of 
harassment”.
112
  
E Highly Offensive 
The final element of Whata J’s test is that the intrusion is “highly offensive 
to a reasonable person”. This is also adopted from Hosking.
113
 This element 
ensures that defendants are not liable for trivial breaches of privacy.114 Only 
                                                     
 
107 See Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 88, at [54]; O’Connell v TVWorks Ltd [2007] 
NZBSA 67 at [68]; and CP v TVWorks Ltd, above n 100. 
108 BQ&CR v TVNZ [2002] NZBSA 193, 194, 195, 196 at [47]. 
109 CD v TV3 Network Services Ltd, above n 106. 
110 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [271]. 
111 Peck v United Kingdom (44647/98) (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 
112 CD v TV3 Network Services Ltd, above n 106. 
113 C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
114 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 at [94]. 
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distressing breaches are protected.
115
 Whata J acknowledged that this 
element of the Hosking test had been subject to criticism, but he believed 
that the offensiveness element was preferable to a one-step reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.116 He felt that the one-step test was not 
sufficiently defined. This is a problem because intrusion cases will often 
involve balancing competing freedoms, thus judges need clear boundaries 
for intervention.117 Whata J then went on to say that the “highly offensive” 
test was satisfied in the case without any further explanation.118 This essay 
disagrees with Whata J. It argues that the offensiveness test should be 
jettisoned because it does little analytical work and fails to protect the 
plaintiff’s dignity.  
This element is of little analytical significance because it overlaps 
with the reasonable expectation of privacy element. Judges have expressed 
such a view in the context of the publicity tort. In Hosking, Tipping J felt 
that offensiveness is generally implicit in any finding that an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable.119 William Young P in the Court of Appeal decision 
in TVNZ v Rogers noted that, in most cases, publicity will be highly 
offensive because it breaches a reasonable expectation of privacy.120 
Commenting on this qualifier in New Zealand’s publicity tort, the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission has said that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is enough to bar trivial claims brought by overly 
sensitive plaintiffs.
121
 
The lack of analytical significance is also evident in the BSA 
complaints process. Privacy Principle 3 requires the BSA to apply an 
objective test to determine whether an ordinary person would find the 
intrusion offensive. But in most cases offensiveness follows automatically 
from a finding of an intrusion upon a space where there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.122 Judges often give no reasons why the intrusion is 
                                                     
 
115 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [126]. 
116 C v Holland, above n 2, at [97]. 
117 C v Holland, above n 2, at [97]. 
118 C v Holland, above n 2, at [99]. 
119 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [256]-[259]. 
120 Television New Zealand v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) at [122]. 
121Law Reform Commission Invasion of Privacy (NSWLRC r 120, 2009) at [5.9]. 
122 See for example Television New Zealand Ltd v KW, above n 90, at [55] – [61]. 
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highly offensive because the requirement entails a value judgment for which 
it is difficult to provide clear reasons.123  
Both of New Zealand’s privacy torts have taken the “highly 
offensive” test from the Restatement.124 The best articulation of this element 
in the United States intrusion context is found in Miller v National 
Broadcasting Company (Miller), where the Court held that in order to 
ascertain offensiveness, courts must consider: (1) the degree of the 
intrusion, (2) the context, (3) the circumstances surrounding the intrusion, 
(4) the motives and objectives of the intruder, (5) the setting into which he 
or she intrudes and (6) the expectations of the persons whose privacy is 
invaded.125 Yet the determining factors for “offensiveness” in Miller are 
almost the exact same considerations found in the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test that this essay suggests the courts should adopt. Factor (1), the 
degree of intrusion, will consider the impact of the intrusion on the plaintiff. 
Factor (2), the context, will examine the nature of the activity the plaintiff is 
engaged in. Factor (3), the circumstances, will look to the method of the 
intrusion. Factor (5), the setting, will focus on the location of the intrusion. 
Factor (6), the expectations of the person whose privacy is invaded, will 
consider any indications that the person did not want the intrusion to take 
place and the reason why the plaintiff is at the location.  
Therefore, there is no need to include the highly offensive limb to 
develop the tort in line with the United States jurisprudence because it does 
the same work as the recommended reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
The one consideration from Miller that might not be covered by the 
recommended test is factor (4), the motives and objectives of the intruder. 
But this consideration is already covered in New Zealand by the “legitimate 
public concern” defence, which is discussed later. 
The danger of including a test that has little analytical significance is 
that it results in the “offensiveness” element becoming very difficult to 
apply, which creates unacceptable uncertainty. This is particularly so when 
Whata J does not give guidance as to how “offensiveness” is to be 
objectively ascertained. For example, is it offensive from the perspective of 
                                                     
 
123 Dr Nicole Moreham “Private Matters: A Review of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority”, above n 73, at 15. 
124 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §§652B & 652D. 
125 Miller v National Broadcasting Company 187 Cal App 3d 1463 (Cal 1987) at 679. 
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a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s shoes?
126
 There is a danger that the 
resulting uncertainty will deter deserving claimants from bringing 
complaints or could have an undesirable chilling effect on broadcasters’ 
newsgathering methods. 
Another criticism of the highly offensive test is that its application 
has failed to protect the plaintiff’s dignity in the publication tort context. In 
Andrews, a documentary crew filmed the victims of a car accident. The 
footage was screened on national television. Allan J declined the plaintiffs’ 
claim on the basis that there was nothing that showed them in a bad light or 
that was embarrassing.127 However, Allan J’s reasoning failed to recognise 
that the highly offensive test exists to ensure relief is given only for 
breaches that cause real humiliation and distress. Although the plaintiffs 
were not portrayed in a negative way, they were filmed in a very intimate 
situation where they were hurt, afraid and vulnerable. This was an affront to 
their dignity that resulted in real humiliation when the documentary was 
broadcast.128   
In Rogers v TVNZ, Elias CJ raised Lord Nicholls criticism of the 
“highly offensive” test.129 He said that it gave an unwarranted weight to an 
unqualified freedom of expression over the right to privacy.130 Thus, by 
adding an additional hurdle to recovery, the highly offensive test will often 
fail to protect plaintiffs even when their dignity is severely undermined.   
The above criticisms suggest that the “offensiveness” limb should be 
abandoned.  
 
F Legitimate Public Concern 
After setting out his formulation, Whata J mentioned that liability could be 
subject to a defence of legitimate public concern.131 He did not explain how 
this defence works because the facts did not require any consideration of it. 
This gives rise to questions about how the legitimate public concern defence 
                                                     
 
126 This is how Nicholson J applied the test in the publicity tort decision in P v D [2000] 2 
NZLR 591 (HC).   
127 Andrews v Televisions New Zealand Ltd, above n 102, at [68] - [69]. 
128 Nicole Moreham “Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the 
New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort”, above n 6, at 242-243. 
129 Rogers v Television New Zealand Ltd [2007] NZSC 91, [2008] 2 NZLR 277 at [36]. 
130 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, above n 114, at [134]. 
131 C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
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will be applied. The Hosking tort, BSA decisions and United States case law 
can provide some answers.  
The legitimate public concern defence is taken from the Hosking 
tort. Gault P and Blanchard J were concerned that the scope of the privacy 
tort might limit freedom of expression beyond that which is justified in a 
free and democratic society.
132
 It is necessary to distinguish matters that are 
of legitimate concern to the public from those which are merely interesting 
to the public on a human level.133 Where there is a legitimate public concern 
in the information publicised, this will be balanced proportionally against 
the harm likely to be caused by the breach of privacy.134 The more serious 
the likely harm caused, the less likely that the defendant’s right to freedom 
of expression will prevail.135  
A similar defence is enshrined in Privacy Principle 8, which allows a 
media defendant to breach a privacy principle where the breach discloses a 
matter of legitimate concern to the public. The BSA employs the same 
balancing test as in Hosking. It has recognised criminal matters, issues 
relating to public health and safety, matters of politics, government or public 
administration, matters relating to the conduct of organisations which 
impact on the public, exposing misleading claims made by individuals or 
organisations and exposing antisocial and harmful conduct as all being of 
public concern.136 The defence is also not available to reporters who go on 
fishing expeditions with the hope of finding illegal or unprofessional 
conduct when there is no prior evidence that such conduct is occurring.137  
In general, the BSA has held that broadcasting footage taken from a 
hidden camera must be justified by exceptional circumstances because the 
recording of such footage will usually involve a substantive intrusion.138  
                                                     
 
132 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [130]. 
133 TV3 Network Services Ltd v The Broadcasting Standards Authority [1995] 2 NZLR 720 
at 733 cited in Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [133]. 
134 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [134]. 
135 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [134]. 
136 Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 88, at [58]. 
137 In O’Connell v TVWorks Ltd, above n 107, the television show Target set up hidden 
cameras in a house and got an actress to portray an elderly woman in need of home support. 
It then hired caregivers a series of caregivers and covertly filmed them going about their 
jobs. This was not in the public interest because there was no indication that the caregivers 
were going to behave illegally or unprofessionally. 
138 Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 88, at [54]; O’Connell v TVWorks Ltd, above n 
107, at [68]; CP v TVWorks Ltd, above n 100.  
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Thus, in TV3 Network Services v Fahey (Fahey) the court held that in the 
circumstances of the case, the obtaining of a surreptitious film was an 
understandable pre-emptive cause of action.139 The Fahey case concerned 
the granting of an injunction to stop the broadcast of footage obtained 
surreptitiously in order to expose that a well-known medical professional 
who was standing for the Christchurch mayoralty had engaged in sexual 
misconduct with his patients. The decision does not support any general 
proposition that the ends of newsgathering justify the means.140  
Care needs to be taken when drawing on the Hosking and BSA 
material because in all these decisions the courts and the Authority have had 
the information in front of them from which they can ascertain whether the 
legitimate public concern in the information trumps the likely harm caused. 
With intrusion, proceedings might be brought against a journalist well 
before publication of the information, and there is even a risk that 
information uncovered from the intrusion may not even turn out to be 
publishable. This makes it more difficult for the court to determine whether 
there was legitimate public concern that justified the intrusion.  
The United States approach to this issue has been to deny the 
existence of a public concern defence, but in some cases to consider 
newsgathering at the highly offensive stage. In Dietemann v Time, Inc 
(Dietemann),141 the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was 
immunized from liability under the first amendment of the Constitution
142
 
(which protects freedom of the press) because it was using the concealed 
recording tools for newsgathering. The Court found that newsgathering 
predates the invention of miniature cameras and recording devices, and 
                                                     
 
139 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey [1999] 2 NZLR 129 at 135. 
140 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey, above n 139, at 136. 
141 In Dietemann v Time Inc, above n 94, the defendants were investigating “quack doctors” 
who were practicing medicine illegally. Dietemann was one of these doctors. An 
undercover investigator for Life Magazine pretended to be a patient and attended an 
appointment with the Dietemann with a hidden audio recording device that transmitted the 
conversations between them to a police car parked outside Dietemann’s home. These 
conversations ousted Dietemann as a fraud. He brought a cause of action against the 
magazine’s owner for intrusion upon seclusion. 
142 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the making of any 
law respecting an establishment of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion, 
abridging the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering with 
the right to peaceably assemble or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental redress of 
grievances.  
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those devices are not “indispensible tools” of newsgathering.
143
 The Court 
in Shulman, relying on Dietemann, rejected the defendants’ argument that a 
newsgathering defence should be available against a claim for intrusion 
where the information is about a matter of legitimate concern to the public 
and the underlying conduct of gathering the information is lawful. It 
reasoned that freedom of expression would not be curtailed by refusing the 
media a general licence to intrude upon another’s privacy on the off chance 
that it finds something worth publishing.144 Instead, the Court held that the 
discovery of socially important information might stop an intrusion from 
being highly offensive.145 
 This essay suggests that the New Zealand courts should not adopt 
the United States approach of considering newsworthiness at the highly 
offensive stage because the highly offensive test is not necessary nor useful. 
Rather, it advocates following Whata J’s suggestion that there be a defence 
of legitimate public concern, but suggests that the defence needs to be better 
tailored to the intrusion context.  
So how should this be done? This essay recommends that this 
defence be available where the intrusion took place for the pursuit of 
information that is of considerable public concern. This would also require 
that the information be obtained honestly through the use of the least 
intrusive means possible.  
The defence should be pitched at a higher standard than in the 
Hosking tort because media defendants should have to point to seriously 
legitimate reasons that justify intrusive newsgathering. The stronger 
requirement of “considerable” (as opposed to “legitimate”) recognises that 
intrusion proceedings will often be invoked in situations where media 
defendants have intruded but have not found anything newsworthy. This 
appropriately balances the need to vindicate privacy rights against the need 
to safeguard deserving investigative reporting. Matters of considerable 
public concern would include situations where there is significant danger to 
health or safety, the detection and prevention of serious crime, exposure of 
matters that are of financial significance to the general public, and exposure 
of matters that could have a significant effect on government or public 
administration. For example, the intrusive investigation in Fahey would 
                                                     
 
143 Dietemann v Time Inc, above n 94, at 249.  
144  Shulman v Group W Productions , above n 69, at 496-497. 
145 This approach taken in Shulman v Group W Productions was reaffirmed in the 
Californian Supreme Court’s decision in Sanders v ABC, above n 95. 
Laws489 Thomas McKenzie 300188699 
 
 
 
 
26
reach this threshold because it had a significant effect on public 
administration. The investigation had the potential to, and indeed did, show 
that the mayoral candidate had committed sexual improprieties during his 
medical career.  
The “honesty” requirement ensures that information is obtained in a 
way that does not involve exploitation of a person’s vulnerabilities, coercion 
or other forms of improper pressure. This protects the dignity interest. Thus, 
the defence would not have been available to the defendants in Shulman 
because they took “calculated advantage of the plaintiffs’ vulnerability and 
confusion” when recording the plaintiffs’ conversations at the accident 
scene and when filming inside the ambulance.146 
The “least intrusive means” requirement limits the defence’s 
availability to situations where intrusion is the only means through which 
the information can be obtained. In certain circumstances it will be 
necessary to make an audio or visual recording in order to prove that an 
activity of considerable public concern is occurring. This would cover 
situations like in Fahey where the surreptitious filming of the conversation 
between Dr Fahey and X, who made the allegations of sexual misconduct, 
was needed to protect X from Dr Fahey’s attacks on the credibility of her 
allegations, especially after he had said, under oath, that she was mentally 
disordered.147  
IV  How Should the Intrusion Tort Interact with the Publicity 
Tort? 
So far, this essay has suggested that Whata J’s formulation should develop 
to require an intentional intrusion that involves an infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an activity, space or affairs, subject to a 
defence of considerable public concern, consent or lawful authorization. 
But, this leaves open an important question about how the intrusion tort 
should interact with the publicity tort. All that Whata J said about the 
relationship between the two torts is that they should remain consistent.148 
Both the publication and intrusion torts require an invasion of a private 
sphere belonging to the plaintiff.149 The fundamental difference between 
                                                     
 
146 Shulman v Group W Productions , above n 69, at 494. 
147 TV3 Network Services v Fahey, above n 139, at 135. 
148 C v Holland, above n 2, at [94] & [96]. 
149 William L Prosser “Privacy”, above n 51, at 407. 
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them is that the intrusion tort does not require publication. It is therefore 
likely that plaintiffs will plead causes of action in both torts. This section 
will briefly consider how the courts might wish to develop the relationship 
between these two torts.  
The United States jurisprudence is useful because both torts have 
existed there for a number of years.
150
 Keith J in Hosking described the 
development of the publicity tort in the United States as: “that ridiculous 
mouse born of all that mountainous labour.”151 This is because the 
“legitimate public concern” (or “newsworthiness”) defence to the publicity 
tort allows news media defendants to escape liability in almost all cases 
because freedom of the press is heavily protected under the Constitution.152 
When a plaintiff pleads both intrusion and publication of private facts in 
relation to the same string of acts, he or she may be successful in one tort, 
but unsuccessful in the other. This was evident in Shulman where the Court 
(at summary judgment) held that the plaintiffs had an arguable case in 
intrusion, but also threw out the publication tort claim because to allow a 
court to find the defendants liable would “assert impermissible supervisory 
powers over the press.”153   
Yet it seems illogical that a court could be prepared to compensate a 
person for harm caused by an intrusion, but then would deny recovery for 
the harm caused by the subsequent publication of any material gathered 
from that same intrusion. This is unfair on plaintiffs because the courts fail 
to acknowledge that the news media’s actions cause harm beyond the 
intrusion itself. Publication of private information has a humiliating effect 
on plaintiffs on a very public level, and failure to provide redress would 
undermine the dignitary interest of the tort. It is also unfair on the news 
media. While the courts acknowledge that the news media has a 
constitutional right to publish a story, this right comes at the price of 
damages for liability in tort. This is morally undesirable because the news 
media is paying for its freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed 
right. This also rewards media defendants who are large enough to afford 
the litigation risk that comes with publishing private information because 
                                                     
 
150 The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, §652D identifies the elements of the 
publication of private facts tort action, the text of which can be found at appendix 4. 
151 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [216]. 
152 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky “Prying, Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What 
the Law Should Do About It” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 173 at 199-200. 
153 Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 69, at 497. 
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smaller media entities that cannot afford the litigation risk are locked out 
from publishing such information.  
Some have suggested that the creation of a compendious tort, which 
would cover both intrusions and publicity given to private facts, could solve 
the problems resulting from the inconsistency between the two torts in 
application.
154
 Other commentators have suggested that the formulation of a 
single tort would be unmanageable given the different interests that the 
intrusion tort and the publicity tort vindicate.155  
This essay advocates striking a middle ground between the United 
States approach and the formulation of a compendious tort. Both torts 
should be maintained, but plaintiffs should be precluded from pleading the 
intrusion tort where there has been publication of private facts gathered as a 
result of an intrusion. Instead, the plaintiff’s only cause of action should be 
the Hosking tort. This would not result in a failure to vindicate plaintiff’s 
interest in seclusion. This is because the courts should still consider whether 
defendants used intrusive methods in order to obtain the private information 
that was published. Tipping J in Hosking said that the circumstances 
through which the defendant comes into possession of the information is 
one method of finding a reasonable expectation of privacy.156 So if intrusive 
methods have been used, then this will assist the plaintiff’s claim in the 
publicity tort. The United Kingdom breach of confidence case, Murray v 
Big Pictures Ltd, illustrates this approach. The defendant took a photograph 
of author J.K. Rowling and her husband pushing their infant down a street in 
a buggy. The nature of the intrusion was relevant to establishing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the photographs. Sir Anthony Clarke 
MR emphasised that the pictures had been taken deliberately and 
                                                     
 
154 See, for example, Skoien DCJ’s decision in Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 at [444] 
where the judge ambitiously created a common law privacy tort to cover all manner of 
invasions that included the following elements:  
(a)  willed by the defendant;  
(b)  which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff;  
(c)  in a manner which could be considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities; and  
(d)  which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of psychological or 
emotional harm or distress which prevents or hinders the plaintiff doing 
an act which she is lawfully entitled to do.  
155 See Stephen Penk and Rosemary Tobin “The New Zealand Tort of Invasion of Privacy: 
Future directions”, above n 47, at 251-252; and also Daniel Solove “Conceptualising 
Privacy” (2002) 90 California Law Revue 1087 at 1130.  
156 Hosking v Runting, above n 22, at [249]. 
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surreptitiously to be published for a profit and there was no doubt that the 
parents would have objected to such photos.157  
If plaintiffs are successful in the publication tort, then the damages 
awarded should compensate for the harms caused by both the intrusion and 
the subsequent publication. This recognises that two separate breaches of 
privacy have occurred. 
V Conclusion 
Whata J’s bold decision in Holland to recognise the intrusion tort as part of 
New Zealand’s common law was a step forward for the protection of 
individual privacy rights. However, the decision poses more questions than 
it answers. This essay has discussed how the courts should develop the 
intrusion tort to balance individual privacy rights against the media’s 
important newsgathering functions. In future, the courts need to give greater 
consideration to the precise meaning of the words in the tort’s formulation 
so that it can best protect the rights that the tort was designed to vindicate.   
 
  
                                                     
 
157 Murray v Big Pictures Ltd, above n 93, at [50]. 
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VI Appendices 
A Appendix 1: Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principles 
Privacy Principle 3 
(1) It is inconsistent with an individual’s privacy to allow the 
public disclosure of material obtained by intentionally 
interfering, in the nature of prying, with that individual’s 
interest in solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.  
(2) In general, an individual’s interest in solitude or seclusion 
does not prohibit recording, filming, or photographing 
that individual in a public place (‘the public place 
exemption’).  
(3) The public place exemption does not apply when the 
individual whose privacy has been allegedly infringed 
was particularly vulnerable, and where the disclosure is 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.  
 
Privacy Principle 8 
Disclosing the matter in the ‘public interest’, defined as of 
legitimate concern or interest to the public, is a defence to a 
privacy complaint.  
 
B Appendix 2: Crimes Act 1961 
216G Intimate visual recording defined 
(1) In sections 216H to 216N, intimate visual recording means a 
visual recording (for example, a photograph, videotape, or 
digital image) that is made in any medium using any device 
without the knowledge or consent of the person who is the 
subject of the recording, and the recording is of— 
(a) a person who is in a place which, in the circumstances, 
would reasonably be expected to provide privacy, and 
that person is— 
(i) naked or has his or her genitals, pubic area, 
buttocks, or female breasts exposed, 
partially exposed, or clad solely in 
undergarments; or 
(ii) engaged in an intimate sexual activity; or 
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(iii) engaged in showering, toileting, or other 
personal bodily activity that involves 
dressing or undressing; or 
(b) a person's naked or undergarment-clad genitals, pubic 
area, buttocks, or female breasts which is made— 
(i) from beneath or under a person's clothing; 
or 
(ii) through a person's outer clothing in 
circumstances where it is unreasonable to 
do so. 
(2) In section 216H, intimate visual recording includes an intimate 
visual recording that is made and transmitted in real time 
without retention or storage in— 
(a) a physical form; or 
(b) an electronic form from which the recording is capable of 
being reproduced with or without the aid of any device or 
thing. 
 
216H Prohibition on making intimate visual recording 
Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who 
intentionally or recklessly makes an intimate visual recording of another 
person. 
 
C Appendix 3: Privacy Act 1993 
6 Information privacy principles 
The information privacy principles are as follows: 
… 
Principle 4 
Manner of collection of personal information 
Personal information shall not be collected by an agency –  
 (a) by unlawful means 
 (b) by means that, in the circumstances of the case, –  
  (i) are unfair; or 
(ii)  intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal 
affairs of the individual concerned. 
 
D Appendix 4: Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) 
§652A 
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(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.  
(2) The right to privacy is invaded by  
(a)  Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; 
(b)  appropriation of another person’s name or likeness;  
(c)  unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; 
and  
(d)  publicity that unreasonably places he other in a false 
light before the public. 
 
§652B 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
 
§652D 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that –  
(a)   would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and  
(b)   is not of legitimate concern to the public.  
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